A conversation between a girl and a soldier in a Balochistan village

“I ran out of my house when I heard children and women crying. I saw four military trucks approaching,” recalled 22-year old Bibi Gul. Then a jeep stopped at the front gate and soldiers laid siege to the house of Mohammed Hussain, a schoolteacher and Bibi Gul’s father. “It was around 11am.”

Bibi Gul had been expecting them since early morning when FC personnel besieged their village on May 24 for a door-to-door search operation. Her house stood at the other edge of Gomazi, a small village, some 70 kilometers from Turbat city. It took soldiers four hours to reach this last abode after they searched rest of the houses in the village. Bibi Gul had seen smoke billowing out from several houses since the morning.

“Where is (The) Master,” one of the soldiers asked Bibi Gul with an authoritative voice, referring to her father by his nickname. Bibi Gul had now been joined by her two sisters and mother. “He has gone outside for some work,” Gul replied, before his sisters or mother could say anything. She was the only one among them who could speak Urdu fluently.  “Where?,” the authoritative voice asked with even more authority. “I don’t know,” she replied, trying to look as truthful as she could.

“I know where he is. He is there in the mountains planning to kill our brothers,” the soldier said. (To be in the mountains is a euphemism in Balochistan for joining Baloch separatist militants.)

“He is just a teacher. Didn’t you just call him (The) Master?” the belligerent girl responded.  “Search the house,” the soldier hastily ordered, seeming unwilling to indulge into a debate with her.

Bibi Gul, her sisters and mother stood still as the soldiers searched every nook and corner of the house. And then they came out, albeit with some of their suspect belongings.

“I have never seen such fury on a man’s face. Their eyes were filled with rage and disgust. It sent shivers  through my body,” recounted Bibi Gul.

“Why do you people do this? Why do you plant bombs on our way? What is your problem with Pakistan?,” the soldier shouted with a choked voice, pointing a book they had retrieved from the house. The title of the book was ‘Jangi Hikmat Amali’ (War Strategies). It was among several other suspicious items they had discovered in the house, including a television, a radio, another book on Dr Che Guevara’s life and the latest edition of the monthly magazine of the Baloch National Movement, a political party which Bibi Gul’s father once led in Gomazi.

“What do you want from Pakistan? Why don’t you tell us your demands?” said the soldier, so overwhelmed by emotion that he almost seemed to be crying.

“We don’t have any demands. Just leave us alone,” the girl replied with a straight face, holding her breath for fear of retribution. However, luckily, the soldier managed to defuse his anger by shouting some “dirty words” into the air.

“Who reads these books?” he asked, after calming himself down. Bibi Gul, not wanting to provoke the soldiers any further, ignored the question. “Your father?” he guessed.

“We all do. Is reading books a crime too?” Bibi Gul quipped. She knew she shouldn’t have said that. She should have controlled her emotions. “Burn the house,” the soldier shouted at his comrades.

“You know what surprised me? They didn’t use a matchstick or a lighter to set the house on fire. They just poured some yellow liquid from a bottle and the fire started on its own,” she wondered.

As they – Bibi Gul, her sisters, mother and the soldiers -- watched flames leaping from the house, the authoritative voice spoke again, this time addressing Bibi Gul’s mother. “If Master doesn’t stop, next time we will set this daughter of yours on fire instead of your house,” he warned, pointing towards Bibi Gul. They left after ensuring that the house had been reduced into ashes.

Gomazi was the first, not the last, village searched in this way in a massive operation initiated by the FC personnel immediately after the elections. The soldiers, after leaving Bibi Gul alone, marched on towards Turbat city, searching other villages that fell in their way.

An outsider's view of Nepal

A tall and heavily-built European tourist, standing at an altitude of 2175 masl on the verdant hilltop of Nagarkot, closes his eyes and takes in a deep breath, as if he had finally achieved nirvana. “You have everything, yet you say you’re unhappy,” he tells my young Nepali guide, Ram, as he reopens his eyes.

Saru, accompanied by her younger sister Sharmila, talks to the author.

Many awestruck foreign tourists, mesmerized by Nepal’s scenic beauty and quaint temples, fail to understand the growing discontent among locals who often scramble to avail of an opportunity to get out of their homeland in search for better jobs. Around an average of 1,500 youths leave Nepal every day in the pursuit of a better life abroad.

Ram labours day and night to strengthen his bank statement to be able to get a visa to Japan. That doesn’t mean he doesn’t love his country. He is annoyingly nationalistic. During my 10-day tour to the South Asian country, he would ask me almost every five minutes to admit that I loved Nepal. “Nepal acha hai na bhayya ji? (You love Nepal, brother, don’t you?). I never responded.

Nepal is one of the poorest countries in the world with 31 percentage of its total population living below national poverty line. It does not help that this Himalayan land is one of the most tempting destinations for tourists throughout the world mainly because of its eight out of world’s 10 tallest peaks, thousands of years old Buddhist temples and rivers feeding on water from Himalaya’s melting glaciers.

Around 800,000 tourists visited the country last year and tourism consultants believe the tourism industry alone has the potential to lift the country out of poverty. “Around 22 million tourists visited Thailand last year and only 0.8 million came to Nepal because we lack the basic infrastructure and facilities. If we manage to attract as many tourists as Thailand does, we will no longer be as poor,” said Bijay, who runs a tourism firm in Kathmandu.

Although Nepal’s centuries-old monarchy was replaced by a shaky democracy in 2008 following a decade-long civil war by Maoists that claimed around 15,000 lives, political parties have so far failed to draft a constitution for the country, let alone alleviating poverty. “We have gathered here on Democracy Day to remind the politicians that nothing has really changed,” said Bidushi Dhungel, who was leading a demonstration of youngsters at Martyr’s Gate, a monument built in the memory of the martyrs of democracy, in Kathmandu. She and other youngsters had been campaigning for the last 50 days against rapes and robberies.

“I wish he had performed better. He didn’t live up to our hopes,” says Maoist leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal’s younger sister, Tara Devi Bhandari. She runs a small restaurant along with her husband, Manahari Bhandari, at their modest house in Khaski while their teenage children work at their fields. “We earn not more than 10,000 rupees per month, both from the fields and the restaurant. Still Maoists want their share (chanda) from it,” claimed Manahari. When asked why they didn’t seek Dahal’s help, the couple said he was practically out of their reach. “Isn’t it ironic? If he doesn’t have time for his family, how the hell is he going to be of any assistance to others?” interrupted a friend, who was accompanying me on the trip.

Better known to rest of the world as Prachanda, Dahal’s Maoist slogans were a ray of hope for many until he became prime minister in 2008. “His term in office proved he isn’t much different from others,” said Manahari.

Saru, Manahari’s 15-year-old daughter, has never seen her uncle in her entire life. He was in the jungle leading a Maoist insurgency when she was a child and now he seems too busy in the affairs of the state to remember his niece. “I’ve only seen him on TV,” she smiles. She shook her head when asked what she knew of Maoists. “Wait,” she said a few seconds later, as if she had realized she knew something of them. “Aren’t they the people who live on others’ income,” she said in a triumphant tone, as if she had just resolved the mystery behind the universe’s creation.

Economic problems are not the only cause of discontent among Nepalis. A country of diverse ethnicities and religions where more than 125 languages are spoken, a number of ethnic communities complain of discrimination based on race, ethnicity, religion and caste. While the national incidence of poverty is 31 percent, hill Janajatis have 43 percent incidence of poverty and low-caste Dalits 46 percent. “The basic problem of Nepal is the 3-Bs – Bad Brahmin Boys. The three ruling parties are being led by three Brahmins and they don’t treat the indigenous people as equal citizens,” said Dr Krishina Bhuttachan, a professor of anthropology at the Tribhvan University in Kathmandu.

He is an ideologue for the Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities, a group fighting for a federal Nepal where all ethnic groups enjoy total autonomy. “Look at this young man,” he pointed to a youngster with Mongloid features sitting next to him. “He can never make a hero in Nepali films because of his narrow eyes and flat nose. He’ll be a good villain though,” he laughed. “Do you know why? Because even the concept of beauty has been defined by the ruling elite.”

He blames Indian support for the continuing hegemony of Brahmins over indigenous Nepali people. “Brahmins comprise 12 percent of the whole population, but they rule the country because they’re being supported by India,” he added.

Landlocked Nepal is highly dependent on neighbouring India, for import and export of goods through sea, making it vulnerable to Indian dictation on key issues. The country’s trade with India accounts for two-thirds of its total trade volume. To maintain this dependence, India has blocked a transit treaty between Nepal and Bangladesh since 1976, which would allow Nepal to use Mongla port for trade, a move that would lessen Nepal’s dependence on India. However, India has rejected Nepal’s requests to allow it to use a patch of Indian territory as a transit route to Bangladesh.

However, despite the country’s political, economic and social problems, Nepali people take pride in the fact that they are relatively more secular, liberal and tolerant than most other South Asian nations, like India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Followers of different religions have learnt to co-exist in harmony and Nepali women aren’t burnt alive for mingling with men. Even in the most rural areas, young women brandish Western clothes and work alongside men. Minority Muslims or Buddhist monks aren’t a source of resentment for the majority Hindus, and vice versa.“That’s where hope comes from. If I can transform from an underworld street fighter into an entrepreneur, why can’t Nepal?” asked a former mafia man, Ram Chandra Khadka, who now owns his own guesthouse and restaurant in Pokhara, the country’s third largest city and the most attractive tourist location.

On February 19, the day I was supposed to fly out of Nepal, Prachanda’s Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) was observing a countrywide strike, locally known as bandh, to protest the formation of an interim government led by the Supreme Court’s chief justice ahead of general elections. No taxis were plying on the road to take me to the airport, as the protesters had vandalized two tourist vehicles and an ambulance van early in the morning for violating their call. As usual, Ram came to my rescue. He took me to the airport on his motorbike. After thanking him and bidding him farewell when I turned to enter the departure lounge, he called out: “Nepal acha hai na, bhayya ji?” Irritated at the frequency of this question, I could only manage to force a fake smile. Now I’m planning to give him an answer during my next trip, before he leaves for Japan.

Mengal stands alone

Akhtar Mengal finds himself caught between the devil and the deep blue sea after his return to Pakistan to contest the coming elections. Both the military and the Baloch separatists – the two key stakeholders in the current conflict in the province – seem out to prevent the former chief minister and son of veteran nationalist leader Ataullah Mengal from participating in the electoral process.

Baloch militant groups have threatened all parties in Balochistan against participating in the elections as they see that such a move could jeopardise their cause for an “independent state.” They have attacked Election Commission officials as well as gatherings of political parties, including the National Party, PPP, PML-N and BNP-A, to discourage election campaigns. These militant groups believe that Mengal’s participation – more than anyone else’s – will cause more harm to their cause because of his reputation as a respected nationalist in and outside Balochistan.

As Mengal still enjoys some support among the cadres of radical nationalist groups, the militants have yet to openly target BNP-M’s men. However, tensions are escalating between the BNP-M and separatist groups, which may lead to an open confrontation soon. In an interview with an English-language daily last month, the Balochistan Liberation Front’s commander acknowledged that the Baloch have a soft spot for Akhtar Mengal, but he accused him of playing into the hands of the military.

On the other hand, the military too considers Mengal a threat to its counterinsurgency strategy and does not relish the prospect of seeing him as the next chief minister. Unlike Aslam Raisani and Jam Yousuf, as chief minister, Mengal would face severe pressure from his party cadre to take concrete steps to stop the alleged ‘kill-and-dump’ operations in Balochistan.

Many expect Shafiq Mengal, a shadowy figure accused by his opponents of running a “death squad” against Baloch nationalists, will be Akhtar Mengal’s first target if the latter comes to power. In Mengal’s absence for the past few years, his tribal and political rival Shafiq not only encroached upon Mengal’s strongholds of Khuzdar and Wadh – with the military’s support – but Shafiq’s Mussalah Difai Tanzeem also claimed responsibility for killing several BNP-M workers in the past. Akhtar Mengal has reportedly claimed in private gatherings that he is still not personally convinced about participating in the elections when ‘his people’ are being abducted and killed by security forces, but he is contesting only to contain Shafiq Mengal.

Meanwhile, Shafiq’s brother, Attaur Rahman Mengal, is pitted against Akhtar Mengal on a provincial assembly seat from Khuzdar in the coming elections. Therefore, if elected, Akhtar Mengal will go for a direct confrontation with Shafiq to regain control over his strongholds. In such a situation, however, analysts fear that the security establishment may not play the role of silent onlooker: as things stand, the nationalists accuse the establishment of having allied with Shafiq in the fight against the separatists. (Incidentally, one of the men arrested for trying to attack a recent BNP-M rally was a close aide of Shafiq.)

To compound these pressures, Akhtar Mengal also proved short of options in forming an electoral alliance with other forces. National Party leaders, especially Senator Malik Baloch, played a key role in persuading Akhtar to return and participate in the elections. The National Party believed that without BNP-M’s participation it could not stand alone against the militants. However, after Akhtar’s return, the National Party has formed an alliance with the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam instead of the BNP-M. Thus Mengal has been left with no choice but to form an alliance with his father’s old friend Mahmood Khan Achakzai’s Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party.

The PML-N chief Nawaz Sharif, who holds Akhtar Mengal in high esteem, may support him in his bid for the chief minister’s slot. However, one of the OML-N’s top leaders in Balochistan, Sanaullah Zehri, remains Mengal’s fiercest tribal and political rival. Zehri, who is unlikely to serve under the BNP-M chief, demonstrated his willingness to sabotage any alliance between the PML-N and BNP-M by naming Mengal and his father in the FIR he registered against the attack on his convoy last month. The BLA had claimed responsibility of the attack. Therefore, PML-N-Mengal agreement is unlikely, given that Nawaz would have to ditch one of his party’s influential leaders in Balochistan to do so. Meanwhile, the rift between Mengal and Zehri has widened as a consequence of the latter’s decision to support Attaur Rehman Mengal.

So while Akhtar Mengal remains the only surviving leader of his stature in Balochistan, ironically, he stands virtually alone.

This article was originally published in The News on May 9, 2013.

From Quetta to Turbat

I was all packed and ready when PIA suddenly decided to cancel its flight from Quetta to Turbat, which I was supposed to take to attend a family wedding the very next day. I panicked and called my uncle in Turbat to inform him that I couldn’t make it. But he was persistent and insisted that I had to come. So I decided to take a bus for Turbat the same evening.

As the bus left the station, I realised that I was wearing black clothes and that my surname was Hussain – enough reason to get killed on my journey to simply see two cousins tie the knot. Details of massacres of bus passengers who had taken similar bus journeys were quite vivid in my mind.

According to reports, passengers had been offloaded from the buses, their identity cards checked, and those with names that sounded ‘Shia’ – lined up and executed by a firing squad on the very road I was travelling on.

During September 2011, 26 Shias with names resembling mine were murdered in Mastung – 30 kilometres from Quetta. Mastung is the stronghold of the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ); this is probably the most dangerous 30 kilometres for Shias and Sunnis with ‘Shia’ names.

I quickly scanned the other passengers to assess the number of potential Shias aboard because the more Shias a bus carried the more likely it would be targeted. I could spot just one person whose Mongoloid features made him a suitable Hazara suspect. He was restless, constantly looking out the front and side windows. Poor man, I thought.

I could at least argue with the LeJ guys, if given a chance, that since I was a Baloch, and the majority of Baloch are Sunnis, I should not be simply murdered for my parents’ short-sightedness for not foreseeing that 30 years later this name could get their child killed. But what argument could this man, with ‘Shia’ written all over his face, have at his disposal to change the mind of his assassins?

However both of us, me and the Hazara suspect, eventually passed those longest of 30 kilometres without our identity cards being checked. Hours later, I got off the bus at zero-point near Vinder to catch another bus for Turbat. But this journey was going to be as anxious for me as the one before it. And it didn’t help that my overzealous journalistic memory came into action and the details of Declan Walsh’s report for The Guardian, titled ‘Pakistan’s dirty secret war’ surfaced in my mind. Walsh had mentioned how the Baloch youth are routinely offloaded from buses on this particular route and their mutilated bodies found dumped somewhere days later.

I was once again counting my chances of getting killed on this lap of the journey – a Baloch, a journalist, nephew of a Baloch nationalist leader murdered much in the same fashion described by Walsh. All these identities had the potential to get me killed.

I recalled quoting a human rights group’s report in one of my articles that said 230 Baloch had been killed and dumped since June 2010 and how Balochistan was the most dangerous region for journalists. I had personally known three who were killed in recent months. Then I remembered a cousin my age being whisked away, tortured, killed and dumped just for being the nephew of a Baloch nationalist leader.

But Lady Luck was on my side that day, and I made it to Turbat safe and sound. I didn’t question my parents on choosing a Shia-sounding name for me. I realised that whatever your identity is, there could be something in your name, your identity card, your past or simply on your face that could get you killed in Balochistan.

This article was originally published in The News on January 13, 2013.

Balochistan's flood victims await relief

QUETTA: In what appears to be a tug of war of interests between the provincial government and non-government organisations (NGOs) over the collection and distribution of relief supplies, around 0.1 million victims of the recent floods in Balochistan are still awaiting assistance ten days after disaster struck.

On September 9, the floods that hit the region washed away 90 percent of the areas in the Naseerabad and Jafferabad districts of Balochistan.Despite the scale of the disaster, the provincial government has restricted NGOs from intervening in the emergency flood response, but has provided only Rs2, 000,000 and 200 tents to the district administration of Naseerabad to help the desperate flood victims. “I don’t understand why they are not allowing the NGOs. I mean the number of those affected is huge and it’s beyond the government’s capacity to cope with it. What will I do with Rs2 million and 200 tents? Just look at the number of victims,” said Ayaz Mandokhel, the top district official in Naseerabad.

Sitting in Mandokhel’s office was an NGO official with a request letter to the deputy commissioner to grant his organisation permission to provide relief supplies to the victims. “This request letter is from the Poverty Alleviation Organisation, Balochistan. What justification have I got not to give them permission? They just want to help the people, after all. But I can’t because I have to follow the PDMA’s orders,” said Mandokhel, showing me the NGO’s request letter.

Many suspect that the provincial government’s insistence on executing the relief work is an attempt to get hold of the funds and supplies to be provided by the international and national aid agencies. “They want the funds for their own”, said another district official on condition of anonymity. “The government doesn’t even have the resources to distribute the supplies to so many flood victims.” Sheltering under their charpoys to escape the scorching heat, the flood victims have been taking refuge on the banks of the Rabi and Pat Feeder canals, which overflowed on September 9 submerging the populated and agricultural parts of the district. According to Assistant Commissioner Naseerabad Abdul Jabbar, some 100 people have died, most of them swept away by the floodwaters.

The victims approach every new face that reaches their makeshift camp with the hope that someone has finally come to their rescue. “What will you give us, “a man with a twirling moustache desperately asked me as I approached him to inquire about their situation.

In a province riven with massive corruption, sectarian violence, a separatist insurgency, enforced disappearances, discoveries of mutilated bodies, Talibanisation and kidnappings for ransom, the inability to mobilise an effective response to the floods epitomises the failure of the provincial government. Displaced by the nationalist insurgency from Dera Bugti in 2005, thousands of Bugtis had taken refuge on the outskirts of Naseerabad, near the Rabi and Pat Feeder canals. Since then, they get dislocated every year after the floods. “I don’t know where this trail of misery is going to lead. I’m uncertain of our final destination,” said Shamsher Bugti, who talked to this scribe from under his charpoy.

Despite the top district official’s claim that 90 percent of the area has been washed away by floods, the Provincial Disaster Management Authority took 11 days to declare an emergency in Naseerabad on the ground that they had not received the assessment report from the district government. “I just assumed charge of office. I’ll get the assessment report prepared as soon as possible,” was Mandokhel’s response.

There is a general perception in the area that the poor and NGOs pray for floods to come every year. The poor will get enough to eat after the floods, thanks to NGOs that spend no more than half of the relief funds provided by international aid agencies.

Both, the NGOs and the poor flood affectees, seem disappointed this year. “After last year’s flood, we had to force them (the flood victims) out of the camps. They had refused to go back to their homes months after the floodwater had receded because they were getting ration at the camp,” said Jabbar, Assistant Commissioner Naseerabad.

However, NGOs, while admitting corruption within their own ranks, claim they do provide some relief, because they say they are accountable to their donors. “We were the first to contact the district administration to get an NOC (No-Objection Certificate). We have told them we have enough supplies in stock to help at least 5,000 victims. We just want to use our own stocks to help. What’s wrong with that?” said Sharaf-ud-Din Zehri, head of a local NGO.

This article was originally published in The News on September 21, 2012.

The Godfather among us

In June 2009, members of MNA Yaqoob Bizenjo’s family received a gift parcel at their residence in Karachi’s upmarket Defence area from someone in Turbat. As they opened the parcel, it exploded. The MNA’s five-year-old daughter, brother and mother were injured. Hours later, reporters in Balochistan were contacted by the Balochistan Liberation Front’s (BLF) spokesman to claim responsibility, saying they deliberately did not make the bomb deadly because they merely wanted to warn the MNA and his father against “sabotaging the nationalist movement”.

As no one had died in the attack, it failed to attract much media attention. And the MNA’s father managed to remain anonymous. It was not until March 6 – when the police accused the MNA’s father of killing his close friend, Deputy Commissioner Gwadar Abdul Rahman Dashti, at his Defence residence – that the people of Karachi realised that a man more internationally notorious than the fictitious Godfather was quietly living in their midst. He is Imam Bheel, one of the world’s top drug kingpins, according to the Obama administration.

Dashti might be the man’s first hit in Karachi, but Bheel is a household name in the Makran region mainly because of the number of people he has allegedly killed or hired to run his underworld drug network. He is considered more influential than any political party and mightier than any intelligence agency. In 2009, US President Barack Obama identified him as one of the four ‘significant narcotics traffickers’ in the world. The man is perhaps one of the top beneficiaries of Balochistan’s strategic location, as he controls the 700 km coastline that plays a pivotal part in the drug trade from Afghanistan and other Central Asian countries to the Gulf and Europe via Iran and Turkey.

Balochistan is a transit point in the international drug trade route. Narcotics are brought from Helmand, a Baloch-dominated province in Afghanistan, to Balochistan from where they are transported to Iran, Turkey and Europe.

Makran’s ports are also the main points used to ship drugs to the Gulf countries, East Africa and Europe. A UN report titled ‘The global Afghan opium trade: A threat assessment’, released in July last year, stated that the ports along the Makran coast – Gwadar, Ormara, Talar, Hingol, Sur Bander, Peeshukan and Jiwani – were being increasingly used for narcotics trafficking. Apart from these ports, the Dalbandin area in Chaghai district and the Mand area in Turbat district, both bordering Iran, are transit points for drug trafficking through the land route.

Bheel controls these transit points single-handedly. He has no open rivals, because they do not live long. In the late 1990s, Keenagi, his main adversary in the whole region, was killed in Turbat city in broad daylight. Keenagi’s cousin and enforcer, Hasan, pledged revenge. But he and at least four of his family members and associates were blown up in his car. The remnants of the family, now left without much muscle power, filed several cases against Bheel for ordering the murders. As always, the orders were reportedly executed by his hotheaded and unruly brother Ishaq Bheel. A soft-spoken man, Imam Bheel’s image is that of a man of compromise. The Gwadar DC murder is perhaps the first case in which he has been accused of personally carrying out a murder.

However, despite his soft image, there had been no dearth of cases against him, but all of them were withdrawn during the government of General Musharraf, the man who ordered the fifth military operation in Balochistan. Media reports suggest Makran’s Zobeda Jalal, Musharraf’s handpicked federal education minister, lent Bheel a helping hand.

Once Bheel was declared clear, he ventured into politics. Initially, he joined the Balochistan National Party-Awami but then switched to the National Party whose leaders had previously been Bheel’s fierce critics. Ironically, in the 2008 elections, his son, Yaqoob Bizenjo, defeated Zobeda Jalal to become an MNA.

While Bheel was focusing on rebranding his image through politics, his formidable power was challenged by the heavily-armed separatist militants, locally known as Sarmachars. The militants blame him for collaborating with the military to counter the nationalist cause. The BLF, the militant group active in the Makran and Awaran regions of Balochistan, has constantly targeted Bheel’s men and installations. In June last year, a ‘caporegime’ in Bheel’s drug business, Haji Lal Mohammad, was gunned down in Mand. The BLF claimed responsibility.

As the power of separatist militants grew in Makran, Bheel’s influence withered. He has now been living in Karachi’s posh Defence area for the past couple of years, seldom visiting his hometown where his business is based. Two days before he allegedly killed the Gwadar DC, top BLF commander Dr Allah Nazar, in an interview with a Balochi television channel, mentioned Bheel’s name more than once among those ‘who deserved death’.

In Bheel’s absence from the area, Keenagi’s crime family has reorganised itself. The late drug lord’s brother, Abdul Rasool, staged a successful jailbreak in Turbat in November 2006 and since then has managed to revive his family’s influence in the drug business. There are rumours that Rasool has declared war against Bheel after the Gwadar DC murder. “Imam Bheel has not killed Dashti, he has killed Keenagi again,” he has reportedly said.

However, despite the diatribes of his rivals and the insurgents against him, Bheel has never publicly threatened his adversaries or criticised the separatist movement. In fact, he seldom says anything publicly, and that is the secret of why he has managed to live in Karachi for so long as a normal resident without being noticed. Bheel has always preferred to operate in silence and in return, everyone else has obediently remained silent about his operations.

This article was originally published in The News on March 13, 2012.

Missing Balochistan

Sajid Hussain

Even if we buy the government’s claim that the number of missing persons in Balochistan has declined, it is only because many of them have lately been found dead. Since June 2010, more than 230 bodies of the previously missing persons have been dumped at abandoned places in the largest but the least populated province. According to the Balochistan Union of Journalists (BUJ), 10 journalists have been killed so far this year.

The missing persons issue and the so-called kill-and-dump spree in the province are as disturbing as the fact that Balochistan’s problem is almost altogether missing from the mainstream discourse. Any mention of Balochistan appears in speeches of politicians and the ranting of anchorpersons only when they intend to be politically correct.

The political parties have yet to include the Balochistan problem in their main agenda. The Jamaat-e- Islami (JI) has shown more concern for an individual, Dr Aafia Siddiqui, than a whole province. At a time when people in Balochistan are talking of separation from Pakistan, the ruling Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) has concentrated its efforts on keeping the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) a part of the government. Imran Khan’s Tehreek-e-Insaf has no time for Balochistan, or for any other thing, as it is out to save Pakistan. The MQM would desperately wait for another opportunity to flaunt its street power in defence of a Musharraf or a Zardari. Nawaz Sharif? Balochistan’s inconsequential electoral value does not guarantee premiership.

Ironically, our news-hungry media seems least impressed by Balochistan’s immense news value. Last month, Turbat city, the cultural hub of the province, remained shut for more than a week without a call for a strike from any of the political parties. Not important enough? OK. Only in Balochistan, the security forces take out rallies and sometimes, especially when their convoys meet roadside blasts, force the closure of shops. Of course, apart from these ‘human-interest stories’, Balochistan is home to more alarming news items, but who would want to become the 11th journalist to be killed this year? Is it not news itself that none of our mainstream newspapers and news channels has a full-fledged correspondent outside Quetta?

Unfortunately, only the security establishment has taken Balochistan seriously. In fact, too seriously. And that is where the real problem lies. In the absence of any check, as the rest of the country largely remains unmoved, the security forces have dealt single-handedly with the political unrest in the province. And that is the only way they deal with any issue. That is the army way. For a political solution, the political forces need to intervene and take the matter in their hands.

If they keep ignoring Balochistan, they may be missing it later.

Regi willing to lay down arms if Iran provides guarantees

By Sajid Hussain

KARACHI: Jundullah chief Abdul Malik Regi has agreed to lay down arms if Iran provides him guarantees that it will respect the rights of the ethnic Baloch.

In a letter to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, the 28-year-old militant commander, who Iran blames is hiding in Pakistan, said that he was "determined to stop the massacre of the Baloch people in the hands of the Iranian regime".

He assures the UN chief and the world community that his organisation will abide by the international laws and human rights values. It is pertinent to mention here that Iran has blamed Regi for the October 18 suicide bombing in Zahedan that killed at least 30 people, including the deputy chief of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.

Regi has also written similar letters to US President Barack Obama and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyeb Erdogan. These letters were posted on Baloch nationalist websites.

In his letter to Obama, Regi has requested the US government to also consider the Baloch issue while formulating its foreign policy towards Iran. "I strongly request you as the president of the United States, which is defending democratic and human-friendly values, to consider the Baloch issue while formulating your government's foreign policy towards Iran. Though foreign policy is always based on national interests, I hope this time human rights values will also be considered by your foreign office." Iran has blamed US for funding Regi's Jundallah.

Recalling the traditional friendly relations between the Turkish people and the Baloch, Regi writes to Erdogan that "the Ottoman Empire was the first to recognise the independent status of Balochistan in the 17th century and it gave the title of Begler Beigi to the Baloch ruler, Noori Naseer Khan." He has asked the Turkish premier to respond to his "religious and moral" call by supporting the Baloch struggle.

Appointment of non-local GPA chairman irks Baloch leaders

By Sajid Hussain

KARACHI: Baloch parliamentarians have protested the appointment of a non-local “junior” official as the Gwadar Port Authority (GPA) chairman by the federal government “despite the presence of senior Baloch officers”.

“We have been saying this from the very beginning that the Gwadar Port is not for the Baloch people. Why a junior non-Baloch official has been made the Gwadar Port chairman by superseding senior Baloch officers?” asked Senator Hasil Bizenjo while talking to this correspondent on phone.

“The rulers are not serious in resolving the Baloch issue and the Balochistan package has been exposed after this discriminatory and unlawful appointment of the Gwadar Port chairman,” said the National Party leader.

The federal government has appointed Commodore (retired) Mohammad Azhar as the acting chairman of the Gwadar Port Authority in the absence of the chairman Aslam Hayat, who is leaving for London. A source in the Gwadar Port told The News that senior GPA officials had written a letter to the federal minister for ports and shipping, conveying their inability to work under a “junior officer”.

Senator Dr Malik Baloch, President National Party, termed the appointment a conspiracy against the Gwadar Port and the people of Balochistan. He wondered why the federal government was further alienating the people of Balochistan by such acts. “Such an unwise and biased action would only widen the trust deficit between the Baloch and the federal government,” he said.

“I can’t understand why a non-local junior official has been made the chairman despite the fact that much senior Baloch officials are serving in the authority. The port’s Director General (Finance) Ghulam Farooq Baloch and DG (Administration) Khair Mohammad Shahwani are much senior to the newly-appointed acting chairman. Why a Baloch can’t be appointed as the port’s head?” questioned Senator Ismail Buledi.

The JUI-F leader said he would raise the issue in the Senate as well as the Senate Standing Committee on Ports and Shipping of which he was a member.

Meanwhile, Balochistan National Party-Awami Senator Mir Mohammad Ali Rind was also highly critical of the appointment of the new GPA chairman. “I strongly reject this appointment as discriminatory and unlawful. This should not have happened at least at a time when the federal government is making tall claims for addressing the grievances of the Baloch”.

Minister for Ports and Shipping Babar Ghauri was not available for comments as he is out of the country

A Baloch perspective on Sharm el-Sheik declaration

By Sajid Hussain

There has been much debate on the reference of Balochistan in the Indo-Pak joint declaration in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt. It remains a thorn in the Indian government's side, as Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is facing firm opposition from voices within and outside the ruling Congress for allowing Balochistan's reference in the joint statement. On the other hand, people in Pakistan see it as a major success, claiming to have put India on the back foot for the first time since the Mumbai attacks in November 2008. However, most of the discussion on the subject lacks a Baloch perspective, who view this development from a different angle.

In an interview with a major Indian daily, the Khan of Kalat Mir Suleman Dawood said the declaration would help highlight the Baloch issue internationally and pave the way for international intervention in Balochistan. He asked India to use the opportunity and raise the issue in talks with Pakistan.

The repercussions that the mention of Balochistan in the communiqué has in store for Pakistan and India is yet to be seen, but it is obvious that it will earn the Baloch case international recognition. That is what the Baloch militants have been fighting for. The killing of Chinese engineers or the abduction of UNHCR official John Solecki was meant, at least partially, to attract world attention. In fact, all insurgencies strive for international recognition. For the Baloch insurgents, the Pakistan government has done the job.

Many Baloch political activists see the Sharm el-Sheikh statement as a turning point for their struggle. It is for the first time that the Baloch issue is being discussed so widely in the international media. Even Obama's special representative to Pakistan and Afghanistan, Richard Holbrooke, commented on it for its importance in terms of regional security.

Before the Sharm el-Sheikh meeting, the Baloch insurgency was little known outside Pakistan. In fact, most of the Indian parliamentarians lack basic information about Balochistan. During a discussion on the joint communiqué in Rajya Sabha on July 29, an Indian parliamentarian, Sharad Yadav, confused Balochistan with NWFP, saying that it was a part of Pakhtunistan. While discussing the inclusion of Balochistan in the declaration, he continued saying that Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan was a true nationalist. More interestingly, one of the most reputed Indian daily, The Statesman, wrote in its August 3 editorial that Khan Abdul Samad Khan was the 'Baloch' Gandhi. However, thanks to the Pakistan government, the Balochistan issue is now set to become common knowledge.

Though the Baloch nationalists may lose some sympathisers in Pakistan for their alleged link to India, yet it is a cost they are ready to pay if their case is recognised internationally. They would not care about the allegation of being Indian agents if their issue is discussed at regional or world forums. In fact, the sense of alienation is so deep among them that they have publicly invited India to help them highlight their issue. In his latest interview to a TV channel, Brahundagh Bugti, Nawab Akbar Bugti's grandson and a leading figure in the Baloch insurgency, had asked India and other countries to help them fight Pakistan. In a relatively more sophisticated comment, veteran nationalist leader Attaullah Mengal had said sometime back that he would even accept the "devil's help" against Pakistan.

The Baloch have nothing to lose -- Pakistan has. Once the Balochistan issue is included in the Indo-Pak talks, especially the composite dialogue process as Prime Minister Gilani has demanded, events in Balochistan will gain international attention. The world will more closely watch nationalist protests, militant activities and government moves in the strategically important region. This will bring a lot of pain for the militancy-hit Islamic republic. Besides, the pressure will come from international rights groups for hundreds of missing political activists, killing of Baloch leaders, and other government measures to suppress the Baloch uprising.

This is the reason why some Baloch leaders believe that India's acceptance to allow the Balochistan reference is tactical. They argue that there was not enough pressure on India to accept such a fate. On the contrary, Pakistan was on the defensive when Gilani and Singh met in Egypt owing to world pressure on Islamabad to act against the Mumbai attack perpetrators. Before the Sharm el-Sheikh meeting, Singh had said that he was expecting Gilani to assure him of dismantling the anti-India terror infrastructure when they would meet in Egypt. However, in a surprise development, rather than pressing Pakistan for action, Singh allowed a mention of Balochistan in the joint statement.

Whether India's decision is tactical or flawed, the disillusioned Baloch have pinned their hopes on the latest developments. However, only time will tell who is going to benefit from the Sharm el-Sheikh declaration.

(Published in The News on August 25, 2009)

Baloch militants make a comeback?

By Sajid Hussain


The Baloch uprising, remaining eclipsed by a much more sophisticated insurgency in Fata and Swat for quiet some time, has made a conspicuous comeback after the abduction of UNHCR's Balochistan chief John Solecki and its claim by a previously unknown Baloch militant outfit Balochistan Liberation United Front (BLUF). A videotape of the kidnapped official was released on Friday in which the kidnappers threatened to kill Solecki within 72 hours unless their demands are met.


Among other things, the incident, which should be seen in a broader perspective of events that have been taking place in Balochistan since 2001, unveils two important aspects of the Baloch militancy: 1) emergence of a new militant group, and 2) the first-time use of a Taliban-like tactic by the otherwise secular Baloch militants.


Both these developments are a matter of worry for the Pakistan government as well as the Western powers, as I will try to explain in the lines ahead.


Previously, three militant organisations have been fighting Pakistani security forces for what they call the 'Baloch cause'. The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) was the first to launch the insurgency in 2001. It was led by veteran nationalist leader Nawab Khair Bux Marri's son Balach Marri until he was assassinated in a little-known encounter with security forces on November 21, 2007. Most of the attacks in Balochistan are claimed by this group, having perhaps the largest infrastructure among the Baloch militant outfits. It's mainly based in Marri areas but its operations are extended to as far as the central Balochistan, including the Brahui-speaking built. The group, known for its resourcefulness, was banned by the government in 2004.


In 2004, another group, the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), earned international fame when it claimed responsibility for killing three Chinese engineers in Gwadar on May 2. Reportedly formed by a former head of the Baloch Students Organisation (BSO), Dr Allah Nazar, the group enjoys support of a significant number of the educated Baloch youth. Dr Nazar was picked up by intelligence agencies on March 25, 2005 from Karachi. However, after remaining missing for around a year, he was surfaced on August 12, 2006 and released after some months. He is in hiding since then. The BLF camps are based in Makkuran and Awaran.


The Baloch Republican Army (BRA) was supposedly created by Brahundag Bugti in 2008 after his grandfather Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti’s assassination on August 26, 2006. The BRA, based in Dera Bugti, has proved to be more aggressive than other groups for the last two years. It has particularly targeted the ‘local associates’ of security forces in Bugti areas.


In the presence of these groups, the appearance of another one should worry the government. There have been rumours in Baloch nationalist circles, as reported by the local media in Balochistan, that the leaderships of the BLA and the BLF have joined hands by agreeing on a merger of the two groups. In view of this, I dash to the conclusion, like many others, that the BLUF, as its name also suggests, is the united front after the merger. If it is true, the Baloch insurgency may gain impetus. The resources and infrastructure of the BLA and the educated cadre of the BLF together tend to give Pakistani forces, already engaged with a ruthless insurgency in the tribal areas, a tough time.


Besides, abduction of a high-profile Westerner is first-of-its-kind activity by the Baloch militants. They have, so far, mostly relied on hit-and-run and remote-controlled device attacks, specifically on military targets. Kidnapping of a Westerner and putting demands for his release is a tactic widely known for the Taliban, who consider Americans and Europeans non-believers and are against their presence in the region. But the Baloch nationalist militants, who do not hide their secular and liberal leanings, have for the first time claimed to have kidnapped a Westerner. It shows their frustration.


“We have kidnapped the UN official to draw the world’s attention to the Baloch cause…. we want the UN to facilitate release of 6,000 missing Baloch and 141 women,” BLUF’s spokesman Shehak Baloch told reporters on phone days after Solecki’s abduction.


The Baloch nationalists have been asking the United Nations and the Western powers to intervene and help them achieve their ‘national rights’. They have particularly demanded help for the release of what they say 6,000 missing Baloch, allegedly abducted by Pakistani intelligence agencies. Recently, a disclosure by a Baloch journalist Munir Mengal -- who was himself abducted and kept in secret custody for around a year -- about rape and torture of a Baloch woman Zarina Marri by intelligence personnel had further provoked the Baloch. Several memorandums were presented to local offices of the United Nations and US consulates by different nationalist groups, asking them to put pressure on Pakistan to release Zarina Marri and other missing persons.


However, neither the world body nor the world power, being too occupied with the Taliban in Afghanistan and Fata, reacted to those appeals. Instead, the United Kingdom included the BLA in its list of international terror groups on Pakistan’s pressure. Later, it arrested Hairbyar Marri and Faiz Baloch on the charge of having links with the BLA on December 4, 2007 in London. The British and Pakistani media had believed at that time that the Baloch leaders were arrested to be exchanged with Pakistan for Rashid Rauf, a suspected terrorist wanted to the UK. This was enough to frustrate the Baloch groups to the extent that they resorted to kidnapping a UN official – an act which may cause them tremendous damage too. They may be declared terrorists by the UN and the US.


Nevertheless, the Baloch militants have sent a strong message to the world body and the Western powers: if you damn care about us we can hurt your interests in the region like Taliban.


The timing of Solecki’s abduction is also important, as it coincided with the arrival of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in Pakistan and also the trial of Hairbyar Marri was in a concluding phase. It is also interesting to note that days after Solecki’s abduction, a Crown Court acquitted Marri from three out of five cases.


In view of this, the Pakistan government should act in haste to address the grievances of the Baloch nationalists, as promised by the Pakistan People’s Party during its election campaign. Downplaying the insurgency in Balochistan may prove to be a fatal mistake, as Balochistan is strategically an important region and Pakistan’s adversaries may exploit the situation in the province for their own vested interests. As a gesture of goodwill, sincere efforts should be made to trace the whereabouts of the missing Baloch. It should also be ensured that incidents like that of Zarina Marri would not happen in future as the Baloch are highly sensitive about their women. One should not forget that Nawab Bugti had thrown down the gauntlets when a Sindhi woman was raped in a Sui hospital allegedly by an Army captain.


At the same time, the UN and the US should show restraint over the abduction of Solecki, who is also a US national, and make diplomatic efforts for his release. UN’s human rights body should show its willingness to play a role in the release of the missing Baloch. This will no doubt help creating a conducive environment for Solecki’s release. On the other hand, the supply route for the Nato forces from Peshawar is already insecure and they cannot afford annoying the secular Baloch militants as one of the proposed alternate supply routes passes through Balochistan.


Also, the Baloch militants should avoid opting for Taliban-like tactics that may hurt their case badly -- internationally as well as nationally. Presently, it is believed, at least by some, that they have picked up arms as the last resort after failing to draw government’s attention to their grievances through political means. But the abduction of a human rights activist and making threats to kill him may turn the public opinion against them.

It's a media war!

By Sajid Hussain

“Publicity is the oxygen of terrorism.” — Margaret Thatcher

Everyone knows terrorists need the media to propagate their cause. But it is hard to believe that the media are attracted towards terrorist activities for increased audiences and profits. In the competing market, news outlets are engaged in more emotion-generating news reporting than purely informational one. News channels love to run a ‘breaking news’ ticker on their screens to attract viewers. And terrorists can help more than anybody else in providing them with a breaking news item. There is a blast, and here is a ‘news alert’.


The primary aim of a terrorist attack is to get attention or publicity. By covering such events, the media in a way help terrorists in their cause. Though we can suggest terrorists -- as our innocent leadership often does -- to stop their terrorist activities, there is no logic behind asking media persons not to cover acts of terrorism. They cannot afford to ignore it. They have a ‘responsibility’ to inform the people. So, rephrasing my previous statement, the media cannot avoid helping terrorists.


One can agree with the government that reporting of terrorism events has its disadvantages, but putting restrictions on media not to cover such events has far greater adverse effects on society. The Musharraf regime, by overemphasizing the damaging aspects of media coverage of terrorist activities, had purposefully put restrictions on the media in the form of the Pemra Ordinance.


All governments love to restrict the media freedom in the name of national security -- a vague concept which is almost impossible to define. The government can stop the media from covering all issues of importance in the name of national security.


Though it is not to restrict the media from reporting acts of terrorism, the nature of such reporting could be debated. Despite the fact that the media are primarily supposed to inform the people, news outlets seem more interested in entertaining them. The logic behind this is not hard to understand. Media organizations can win an increased viewership/readership by sensationalizing events. Therefore, despite naively asking media organizations to stop giving coverage to terrorists, they could be requested not to sensationalize terrorism events.


Media should understand that terrorists are fighting a psychological war. They are far inferior militarily to the NATO or Pakistani forces. They know they cannot win the war with military means. Therefore, they are more focused on using psychological tactics to defeat their adversaries. A suicide attack is not only meant to kill people. Taliban’s suicide bombings are primarily targeted against the morale of their adversaries. They want to defeat their well-armed ‘enemy’ at the psychological front as they know it is not doable on the battlefield.


For terrorists, media coverage is the only measure of success of a terrorist attack. It’s not the number of people they kill, which amuses them. They use the yardstick of media coverage to measure their success. Maulana Fazlullah’s FM channels, Tehrik-e-Taliban’s spokesman Maulvi Omar’s regular media interactions, Al-Qaeda’s media productions house As-Sahab, and militant’s video messages to news channels all suggest that militants are fighting a sophisticated, propaganda warfare.


As-Sahab produced 58 videos in 2006 and 97 videos in 2007. In February 2006, the then US secretary of defence Donald Rumsfeld warned that his country was losing a media war against Al-Qaeda. "Our enemies have skilfully adapted to fighting wars in today's media age, but... our country has not," he had said. From all appearances, terrorists seem to have a highly-developed propaganda mechanism. They are using the means of mass communications, including the print and electronic media, in their benefit.


Britain's former spy chief and former governor BBC Dame Pauline Neville Jones accused the BBC in September 2007 for being used for Al-Qaeda’s propaganda. "Is the BBC so naive as to take Al-Qaeda's propaganda at face value? Or is there something more sinister at work here?" she had asked.


She is right, but why blame the BBC alone? Almost all the media organizations are being used by Al-Qaeda and the Taliban to propagate their cause. But, unlike Pauline, I don’t suspect that “something sinister” is at work. I rather believe the media cannot avoid being used by terrorists in the given market conditions. However, media owners would have to voluntarily forgo some of their profits to avoid a terrorist takeover in the country.


This is a media war. Journalists and media owners can fight it more impressively than the troops. As terrorists carry attacks mainly for media coverage, they will get frustrated and eventually demoralized if they do not get their desired coverage.

Balochi stories

By Sajid Hussain

The art of storytelling is as old as the mountains. The short story as it is known today, however, was developed in the 19th century with the publishing of journals and newspapers. It is, therefore, a latecomer to the world of literature as compared to the other major literary genres, including poetry and the novel. Its entry in Balochi literature took place even later. Balochi short stories hardly have a literary tradition of 50 years.

Sher Muhammad Marri, a nationalist leader and guerrilla commander during the Baloch insurgencies of the 1960s and 1970s, is regarded by most historians of Balochi literature as the pioneer of the Balochi short story for his ‘Ganoukh’.

These 50 years have seen the emergence of many regular and industrious writers of the genre but, unfortunately, none seem to have mastered the art. Still deprived of a practitioner to be proud of, the Balochi short story is in fact the most embryonic genre of Balochi literature. The backwardness of the genre is obvious from the fact that Naguman’s recently published Nagdaank is the first collection of critical articles on the subject.

Naguman, a medical doctor by profession, is himself a writer of short stories. His first collection, Dar-i-Asp (2004), was genially received by readers and warmly acclaimed by critics.

Humour and satire are the most prominent ingredients in Naguman’s writings. He is known as the “naughty boy” of Balochi literature for his sense of humour which he often uses against his contemporaries but without heaping scorn on them. Due to this, besides the lucidity and clarity of his style, Naguman enjoys perhaps the largest readership among Balochi writers of his time.

Nagdaank is divided into two parts: the first comprises articles written by Naguman on the art of writing short stories and the other Balochi story writers; the second consists of articles written by different writers on Naguman’s art of story writing. Naguman seems to be more inclined towards practical criticism, however, a couple of his articles in the book also address theoretical issues.

According to Naguman, a short story besides being short and artistic should also have a proper story line. He argues that a short story should be confined to 200 to 10,000 words and should be read in a single sitting. This definition of the genre, though helpful, may be too traditional and outdated. The short story has undergone tremendous changes since its emergence in the 19th century. If Naguman’s restrictions are kept in mind, Chekhov’s ‘Steppe’ cannot be considered a short story as it comprises some 40,000 words. The same is true for D.H. Lawrence’s ‘The fox’.

Naguman’s definition of a ‘story’, as an element of the short story, is also vague and misleading. He defines it as a “flowing stream of thought delicately arrayed”. Whereas, in its simplest form the “story designates the narrated events, abstracted from their disposition in the text and reconstructed in their chronological order, together with the participants in these events” (Narrative Fiction: Contemporary Poetics by Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan).

Naguman’s understanding of the short story is mostly based on common sense assumptions. His critical writings do not reflect a great deal of reading on the art and history of the subject. Nagdaank, when dealing with theoretical issues of the short story, does not offer an impression of the latest trends developed in the field over the past few decades. Structuralistic interpretation of the short story, in particular, has shaken the whole body of traditional assumptions.

But, as stated earlier, the Balochi short story is still in its embryonic stage. Therefore, Naguman’s traditional analyses may serve some purpose. Yet, at the same time, these critical articles are not at all helpful for the understanding of some modern experiences of the Balochi short story such as that found in A.R. Dad’s symbolic stories.

On the other hand, Naguman appears more dexterous and confident when dealing with matters concerning practical criticism. His assessment of the Balochi short story and his comments about most Balochi short-story writers seem valid and insightful. He notes that Balochi literature has not yet produced a single first-class story writer during the past 50 years; but at the same time he is somehow optimistic about the future of the genre as he sees a number of promising young writers emerging on the scene. He is a harsh critic of some senior writers, particularly of Ghani Parwaz. Indeed, most of his articles revolve around Parwaz’s art and personality.

The second part of the book, which comprises articles written by different writers on the art of Naguman’s story writing, pieces by A.R. Dad and Ghulam Farooq’s works, are worth mentioning. Mr Dad dubs Naguman’s story ‘Dar-i-Asp’ (Naguman’s representative story and the title of his collection of stories) as pedagogical and didactic. However, Mr Farooq regards him as a distinct writer and praises his objectivity, characterisation, choice of stories and clarity of style.

Nagdaank, despite its weaknesses, is a welcome addition to Balochi literature. It is, after all, the first and only work of its kind.

(Published in Dawn’s Books and Authors on February 25, 2007)

Balochi books in 2005

By Sajid Hussain

Naguman, a young and promising Balochi story writer, once wrote: “Urdu literature had produced its most brilliant story writer, Manto, within the first 25 years of Urdu story writing. Balochi literature, unfortunately, could not produce even one good writer during the last 50 year’s history of the genre.” This statement can be confirmed by the fact that not a single book of Balochi short stories was published in 2005. On the contrary, more than a dozen poetry collections, including at least four of unprecedented calibre, were published in the same year.

Modern Balochi poetry is in a way fortunate as great poets, such as Ata Shad, Syed Zahoor Shah Hashmi, Munir Momin, Manzoor Bismil and Asif Shafiq have composed their masterpieces in Balochi. On the other hand, there isn’t a single name in Balochi fiction which can compete with these poets. Balochi poetry has had a glorious 600-year history of poetic tradition and convention. Fiction, an imported genre, hardly has a history of 50 years.

When a writer uses a literary genre for his creative expression, he also automatically sets his own rules and traditions which will be followed, reformed and modified by his successors. Balochi fiction has been unfortunate in this regard, as it hasn’t yet found a writer of such calibre. Until a writer uses prose as his or her major medium of expression, this form of Balochi literature is unlikely to develop.

Har Sahat Chakkas, a novel by Dr Fazal Khaliq, was the only novel published in 2005. Dr Fazal, a poet who has a few translations to his credit (most of which went unnoticed), has written a novel which may not even be taken as a novel if the form and structure of novel writing is kept in mind.

Last year, however, was quite significant with respect to Balochi poetry. Some great works were published. Most significant among these was Darya Chankey Housham Ent, Munir Momin’s second collection of poetry. The book contains both ghazals and nazms, including “Kapoot deewanagein murgey”, a long poem. This book is being regarded as a trend-setter by readers and critics.

Mir Umar Mir’s Pulley Gwat Andem Ent is another significant collection of poetry published in 2005. Mir regards Momin (as both are residents of Pasni, a coastal city in Makkuran) as his literary guru. In fact, so impressed is Mir by Momin that sometimes it seems difficult to distinguish between the two. Like Momin, Mir is a symbolist in the modern sense of the term. Nevertheless, Mir is, to a great extent, a poet of individual talent, with his own diction and tone.

Ambouhein Drout, a collection of ghazals by Zafar Ali Zafar, also came out in 2005. Zafar is regarded as the king of Balochi ghazal or, at least, that is how he likes himself to be known. Lovers of Balochi poetry have waited for this collection for the last four decades as Zafar wrote his first and most popular ghazal in the 60’s.

Lacha Taryak Shakar is Ambar Sameen’s first collection which was overwhelmingly welcomed by serious readers of Balochi poetry. Ambar is regarded as a pioneer of modern Balochi nazm. Ambiguity adds to the aesthetics of his poetry. He seems to be profoundly impressed by N.M. Rashid, one of the most respected names in modern Urdu nazm. Like Rashid, Ambar also enjoys experimenting with the techniques and form of the free verse.

The publication of late Syed Zahoor Shah Hashmi’s Gisad Gwar in 2005 was a major event in the history of Balochi literature. Hashmi is known as the Father of Balochi. As a poet, novelist, critic, researcher, linguist, historian and lexicographer, he has written over two dozen books, nine of which are still unpublished. Gisad Gwar is a long poem of more than 1,000 lines, in which Hashmi has depicted his own version of Baloch history. The book is a unique experiment in modern Balochi poetry.

Chawtar is Anwar Sahib Khan’s collection of poetry which went unnoticed. Khan is a nationalist poet with a resounding voice in his verses. His poetry mainly emphasizes on the sufferings of his people. The present unrest among Balochis has been depicted in a straightforward manner. Recently, he wrote a poem (not included in the book) in praise of militant organizations, such as the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF). He is very popular among the Baloch youth due to his revolutionary verses, but somehow his book didn’t do well.

Isaq Khamosh’s Wahag-i-Tun was a best seller in 2005. Khamosh is a poet of the masses. His language is simple and his subjects are quite common. Wahag-i-Tun is his second collection of poems. His first collection, Guman, was published in 2004.

Shalinee Burfein Chadar is Lal Baksh Panwani’s collection, which has been compiled by Dr Fazal Khaliq. Panwani’s verses are composed in the traditional form and diction. Fazal Hayat’s Gidan-i-Sahag and Nadeem Akram’s Alhan are some of the other collections of poetry published last year.

As mentioned earlier, no major work of fiction was published in 2005. Namdiani Drout is a collection of letters written by many late literary personalities to Professor Saba Dashtiari, a notable name in Balochi literature and research. These letters have been compiled by Dashtiari himself. Ulfat Naseem’s Tibbi Lughat is a medical dictionary. Despite many weaknesses, it is an initial attempt to produce this kind of reference material.

Gulzar Marri’s Gwashtan, a book of Balochi proverbs and Haji Abdul Qayum’s Balochi Bomia, one of the very first books about Balochi grammar were reprinted last year by the Balochi Academy. This government-backed institution also published two significant works in Urdu: Wahid Buzdar’s Jadeed Balochi Shairi Ka Aghaz or Irteqa (the origin and development of Balochi poetry), and Abdul Saboor’s Warsa-i-Nasiriat, a book about the legend Gul Khan Naseer.

(Published in Dawn’s Books and Authors on February 19, 2006)